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UNREASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
EXAMINING EEOC V. ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL,
INC. AND NONCOMPETITIVE REASSIGNMENT
Amy Rankin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you work as a hiring manager for a hospital. Your
primary concern when making hiring decisions is the safety and
well-being of the hospital’s patients. Accordingly, it is your practice
to staff hospital positions with the best-qualified applicants.
Now, imagine you have two qualified applicants for a position
that involves training nurses. Applicant #1 is clearly the better
choice; she has more experience and more years of education in the
field. However, by law, you must hire Applicant #2, who was
recently demoted and has a final written warning on her record.
Why? Because your circuit court of appeals has held that if an
employer cannot reasonably accommodate an employee with a
disability in their current position, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) requires the employer to reassign that employee to a
vacant position, regardless of whether there are more qualified
applicants. Because Applicant #2 happens to be an employee with a
disability, you must hire her over Applicant #1.1
Currently, the circuits are split over whether the ADA mandates
noncompetitive reassignment in scenarios such as the one described
above.2 A majority of circuits, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, have held that noncompetitive
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
University of California, Santa Barbara. Special thanks to the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for their helpful suggestions.
1. The facts of this hypothetical scenario are based on the facts of EEOC v. St. Joseph’s
Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
2. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the ADA does not require noncompetitive reassignment), with EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc.,
693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ADA does require noncompetitive
reassignment).
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reassignment is not mandated by the ADA.3 The Seventh, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits, in contrast, have held that the ADA mandates
noncompetitive reassignment.4 In EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hospital,
Inc.,5 the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on this debate, joining the
majority of circuits that do not require noncompetitive
reassignment.6
Part II of this Comment will describe the facts of St. Joseph’s
Hospital. Part III will discuss how the Eleventh Circuit arrived at the
conclusion that the ADA does not mandate noncompetitive
reassignment. Part IV will provide a brief background of the ADA
and reasonable accommodation. Part V will present an analysis of
the noncompetitive reassignment circuit split and explain why the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph’s Hospital is proper in light
of the ADA, precedent, and policy considerations. Finally, part VI
concludes that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in St. Joseph’s
Hospital was proper and that should the Supreme Court weigh in on
this circuit split, it should find that the ADA does not require
noncompetitive reassignment.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
Leokadia Bryk (“Bryk”) worked as a nurse at St. Joseph’s
Hospital (the “Hospital”) from January 2, 1990, until November 21,
2011.7 Specifically, Bryk worked in the Hospital’s Behavioral Health
Unit (“BHU”), “an in-patient psychiatric unit for patients who . . .
[presented] an imminent danger to the patient or to others.”8 Patients
in the BHU were housed in one of three units: a pediatric unit, a
progressive unit, or an intensive unit.9 Bryk worked in the
3. See Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384–85 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC
v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695,
700 (5th Cir. 1995); Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 459 (6th Cir. 2004); Huber
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007).
4. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
5. 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (St. Joseph’s Hospital II).
6. Id. at 1345.
7. EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., No. 8:13–cv–2723–T–30TGW, 2015 WL 685766, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (St. Joseph’s Hospital I).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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progressive unit, which housed patients “that were ‘less violent’ than
those in the intensive unit.”10
On October 17, 2011, the Hospital demoted Bryk after she
admitted that she had “allowed patients to sleep in the hallway
during staff shortages.”11 Prior to her demotion, Bryk was employed
as a Clinical Nurse III—a position that involved supervising other
nurses in the unit and spending “a significant amount of time behind
a desk.”12 After her demotion, Bryk became a Clinical Nurse II,
which involved more patient interaction and more time in the
hallways and patient rooms.13
Between 2002 and 2009, Bryk developed a series of health
problems.14 In 2002, Bryk began experiencing back pain and was
subsequently diagnosed with spinal stenosis.15 Bryk also developed
arthritis and, in 2009, underwent a hip replacement surgery.16 In
2009, Bryk began using a cane in the psychiatric ward of the
Hospital.17
Susan Wright (“Wright”), the Hospital’s Director of Behavioral
Health Operations, began supervising Bryk after her demotion in
October 2011.18 Wright observed Bryk using a cane in the
psychiatric ward and became concerned that patients could use the
cane as a weapon.19 Wright raised this concern with Bryk, who then
produced a doctor’s note recommending Bryk’s use of the cane in
the psychiatric ward.20
On October 21, 2011, the Hospital notified Bryk that due to
safety concerns, she could no longer use her cane in the psychiatric
unit.21 Because Bryk was recently demoted and had a final written
warning in her personnel file, she was technically ineligible for a job
transfer.22 However, the Hospital made an exception and gave Bryk

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
St. Joseph’s Hospital II, 842 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
St. Joseph’s Hosp. I, 2015 WL 685766, at *1.
St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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thirty days to identify and apply for vacant positions.23 During this
thirty-day period, Krista Sikes (“Sikes”), the Manager of Team
Resources, was available to Bryk to answer questions and help with
the application process.24
At the beginning of Bryk’s thirty-day period, Bryk told Sikes
that she was going on a previously scheduled two-week vacation and
would not look at the Hospital’s job board until she returned.25 In the
following thirty days, Bryk did not contact Sikes about the
application process, the application portal, or the details of any
position.26 In fact, Bryk did not apply for any position until three
weeks into the thirty-day period.27 Of the seven hundred vacant
positions listed on the job board, Bryk applied to seven.28 Of these
seven positions, Bryk applied to three on the last day of the thirtyday period and one after the period had already expired.29 Although
the Hospital had authorized Bryk to apply to these positions as an
internal candidate, she submitted all of her applications as an
external applicant.30
At trial, the parties focused on three positions that Bryk applied
for: Education Specialist, Home Health Clinician, and Care
Transition Coordinator.31 The Education Specialist position involved
training nurses in a variety of units and conducting a monthly
orientation of new hires.32 “Although Bryk met the requirements on
the job post, [the hiring manager for the position] thought [Bryk]
would need at least one or two years of ‘medical surgical experience’
and ‘more education experience, as well.’”33 Accordingly, the
Hospital rejected Bryk’s application.34
The Home Health Clinician position involved caring “for
patients in their homes following their discharge from the hospital.”35
The Hospital did not hire Bryk for this position because when Bryk
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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submitted her application, the Hospital had already filled the
position.36 However, the Hospital claimed that even if the position
were vacant, Bryk was not the best-qualified candidate for the
position because she lacked both home health and wound care
experience. 37
The Care Transition Coordinator position involved going to
hospitals, gathering patient information, and coordinating posthospital home care.38 However, the Hospital said that this position
was “not available and posted in error.”39 In any event, the Hospital
claimed that even if the position were available, “Bryk was not
sufficiently qualified because she lacked experience in surgery and
acute treatment.”40
Ultimately, the Hospital did not hire Bryk for any of the
positions for which she applied.41 Accordingly, on November 21,
2011, the Hospital discharged Bryk.42
B. Procedural History
On October 23, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) filed suit on behalf of Bryk against the
Hospital.43 The EEOC alleged that the Hospital violated the ADA in
two ways. First, the EEOC claimed that by not allowing Bryk to use
her cane in the psychiatric unit, the Hospital failed to provide Bryk
with a reasonable accommodation.44 Second, the EEOC alleged that
by making Bryk compete with other applicants for the vacant
positions, the Hospital had violated the ADA.45
Before trial, both parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted both motions in part, finding that although Bryk
was considered a person with a disability for purposes of the ADA,
“there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bryk was
entitled to reassignment to either the Educational Specialist or the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 1339–40.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
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Care Transition Coordinator position.”46 In a subsequent order, the
district court further held that the Hospital was not required to
reassign Bryk to a vacant position without competition.47 Instead, the
court explained, whether an employee with a disability “had to
compete with others for the vacant position is one factor, out of
many, that the jury may consider regarding the reasonableness of the
accommodation.”48 In the following section, this Comment will
focus on the Eleventh Circuit’s review of this holding.
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
In St. Joseph’s Hospital II, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that
Bryk was both “disabled” and a “qualified individual” under the
ADA.49 Thus, it turned to the question of whether the Hospital
violated the ADA by making Bryk compete with other applicants for
vacant positions at the Hospital.50 To answer this question, the
Eleventh Circuit first turned to the text of the ADA, noting that while
the ADA requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an
employee with a disability, “it does not say how an employer must
do that.”51 Instead, the statute “offers a non-exhaustive list of
accommodations that ‘may’ be reasonable,” and reassignment to a
vacant position is but one item on this list.52 The court noted that the
use of the word “may” in this context implied not that reassignment
would always be reasonable.53
After analyzing the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirement, the Eleventh Circuit turned to precedent. The court
analogized the Hospital’s best-qualified applicant hiring policy to the
seniority system at issue in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S.
391 (2002).54
In Barnett, the Supreme Court “was confronted with the issue of
whether an employer, in order to comply with the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation duty, must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1344.
See id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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position in spite of the fact that the employer’s longstanding seniority
system would award the position to a more senior, non-disabled
employee.”55 There, the Supreme Court established a test to be used
in situations where an employer has claimed that a request for
reassignment by an employee with a disability would violate a
disability-neutral hiring policy.56 Under the first step of the Barnett
test, an employee must show that the requested accommodation is
“reasonable in the run of cases.”57 If the employee makes this
showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to show that granting the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship under the
particular circumstances of the case.”58 If, however, the employee
fails to show that the accommodation is reasonable in the run of
cases, “the employee can still prevail by showing that special
circumstances warrant a finding that the accommodation is
reasonable under the particular circumstances of the case.”59
Ultimately, the majority in Barnett held that in the run of cases,
it would not be reasonable for an employee’s ADA request to trump
an existing seniority system because of the loss of benefits and other
practical difficulties that might accompany a departure from an
existing seniority system.60 Drawing on this result, the court in St.
Joseph’s Hospital held that, like the seniority system in Barnett, the
Hospital’s best-qualified applicant policy trumped Bryk’s request for
reassignment.61 Applying the first step of the Barnett test, the Court
held that, “[r]equiring reassignment in violation of an employer’s
best-qualified hiring or transfer policy is not reasonable ‘in the run of
cases.’”62 As explained by the court:
As things generally run, employers operate their businesses
for profit, which requires efficiency and good performance.
Passing over the best-qualified job applicants in favor of
less-qualified ones is not a reasonable way to promote
55. Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 933 (2003).
56. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1346; Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–03.
57. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d
356, 361 (3d Cir. 2002)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
61. St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d at 1346.
62. Id.
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efficiency or good performance. In the case of hospitals,
which is this case, the well-being and even the lives of
patients can depend on having the best-qualified personnel.
Undermining a hospital’s best-qualified hiring or transfer
policy imposes substantial costs on the hospital and
potentially on patients.63
The court bolstered its conclusion by noting that the purpose of the
ADA was not to mandate preferential hiring of employees with
disabilities or “turn nondiscrimination into discrimination,” but
rather to ensure employers provide employees with disabilities with
“meaningful equal employment opportunities.”64 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the holding of the lower court.65
IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”).66 Its purpose, among other things, was to “assure equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for [individuals with disabilities].”67
The predecessor to the ADA was the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.68 However, while the Rehabilitation Act applied only to
“federal government agencies, government contractors, and
recipients of federal funds,” the ADA is significantly more
expansive, applying “to enterprises in both public and private
sectors.”69
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
qualified individuals on the basis of disability.70 The statute defines a
“qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1346–47.
65. Id. at 1347.
66. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1994).
67. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
68. Carrie L. Flores, Note, A Disability Is Not a Trump Card: The Americans with
Disabilities Act Does Not Entitle Disabled Employees to Automatic Reassignment, 43 VAL. U. L.
REV. 195, 202 (2008).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”71 The
Act prohibits discriminatory practices such as: refusing to hire a
qualified individual because of his or her disability, firing a qualified
individual because of his or her disability, and refusing to promote a
qualified individual because of his or her disability.72 In this sense,
the ADA is similar to other non-discrimination bills passed in the
second half of the twentieth century, such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”).73 However, the ADA departs from
these statutes in that the ADA is not merely an antidiscrimination
statute.74 Title VII and the ADEA prohibit employers from making
discriminatory hiring decisions, but “do not impose any affirmative
obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily
performing the essential functions of the job.”75 The ADA, in
contrast, does impose an affirmative obligation on employers. This is
seen in the ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement.
B. Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment
Under the ADA, an employer discriminates against an employee
with a disability if the employer fails to make reasonable
accommodation for the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified employee, unless providing the accommodation
would cause an undue hardship on the employer.76 The statute
provides that reasonable accommodation may include: “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or

71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
73. Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1045, 1047 (2000).
74. Id. at 1047–48; see PETER BLANKE ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY
55 (3d ed. 2014) (“The explicit command that employers accept the burden of paying for
accommodations—up to the undue hardship ceiling—arguably sets the ADA apart from other
civil rights legislation and has created significant theoretical and practical disputes.”).
75. Befort & Donesky, supra note 73, at 1047.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A).
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interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.”77
The ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement has been
heavily litigated.78 Reassignment, in particular, has proven to be a
subject of much controversy.79 Reassignment is typically the
“reasonable accommodation of last resort,” meaning it is generally
employed only when an employer has exhausted all other
alternatives that might allow an employee to remain in their
position.80 The primary question that has arisen regarding
reassignment is whether this form of reasonable accommodation
requires employers to reassign employees with disabilities to vacant
positions, even where there are more-qualified applicants.81 In
Barnett, as discussed above, the Supreme Court addressed this issue
in the context of a seniority system.82 However, in its 5-4 decision,
the deeply divided court appeared to resolve this issue only in part.
Although the court held that noncompetitive reassignment was
unreasonable “in the run of cases[,]” it did not address whether
noncompetitive reassignment would be reasonable in the context of
non seniority-based hiring systems. 83 Thus, courts have been left to
determine whether this holding can be extended to other
nondiscriminatory hiring policies. Barnett’s five separate opinions
indicate that even the Supreme Court has not come to a consensus on
this issue.
V. ANALYSIS
In the following section, this Comment will provide an analysis
of the noncompetitive reassignment circuit split. It will then defend
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in St. Joseph’s Hospital and discuss
why its holding is appropriate in light of the ADA, precedent, and
policy considerations.

77. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added).
78. Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues:
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 440–41 (2002).
79. Id. at 441.
80. Befort & Donesky, supra note 73, at 1085.
81. Befort, supra note 78, at 453–55.
82. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
83. Id. at 403.
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A. The Circuit Split
In the period since Barnett, courts have come to varying
conclusions regarding whether noncompetitive reassignment is
mandated in non seniority-based hiring systems.”84 In Huber v. WalMart Stores, Inc.,85 the Eighth Circuit used the reasoning of Barnett
to conclude that the ADA “does not require an employer to reassign
a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a
reassignment would violate a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy of
the employer to hire the most qualified candidate.”86 The Seventh
Circuit, in contrast, has read Barnett to require reassignment without
competition.87
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Huber.88 Many
believed that the Supreme Court would take this opportunity to
ultimately resolve the noncompetitive reassignment circuit split.
However, the parties settled before oral argument commenced.89
Thus, the circuits remain split.
The circuits that have weighed in on this issue have primarily
taken one of two positions. The circuits that have held in favor of
noncompetitive reassignment have typically held “that Congress
designed the ADA to compel employers to make reasonable
accommodations for disabled employees, not simply to consider
providing accommodations. If reassignment is optional, the argument
goes, the ADA’s reassignment provision lacks any bite.”90 These
circuits have also emphasized that this conclusion is appropriate in
light of the EEOC’s Interpretative Guidance, which states that

84. Michael Creta, The Accommodation of Last Resort: The Americans with Disabilities Act
and Reassignments, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1708 (2014).
85. 486 F.3d 480 (2007).
86. Id. at 483.
87. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). Prior to Barnett, the
Seventh Circuit held that the ADA does not mandate noncompetitive reassignment. EEOC v.
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). However, in United Airlines, the
circuit reversed its course in light of Barnett. See United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 760.
88. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 552 U.S. 1074 (2007) (granting certiorari in part).
89. Lyle Denniston, Granted Case on Disability Rights Dismissed, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14,
2008, 10:08 A.M.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/01/court-seeks-advice-on-settling-workerclaims.
90. Nicholas Dorsey, Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split and Need
for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 445 (2009).
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reassignment must not involve any competition for the vacant
position.91
The circuits that have rejected mandatory reassignment,
however, have largely contended that forcing employers to reassign
employees with disabilities to vacant positions constitutes
“affirmative action with a vengeance” and is simply not warranted by
the ADA.92 As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Dalton v. Subaru–
Isuzu Auto., Inc.:
[W]e have been unable to find a single ADA or
Rehabilitation Act case in which an employer has been
required to reassign a disabled employee to a position when
such a transfer
would violate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory policy of the employer, . . . and for good
reason.
The contrary rule would convert
a
nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference
statute, a result which would be both inconsistent with the
nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable
imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled
employees.93
These circuits have also noted that if Congress intended to require
noncompetitive reassignment—a controversial proposition—“it
would certainly not have done so by slipping the phrase
‘reassignment to a vacant position’ in the middle of this list of
reasonable accommodations.”94 Accordingly, these courts have
found that mandating noncompetitive reassignment constitutes an
impermissible expansion of the ADA.95
B. Mandatory Noncompetitive Reassignment
Is Contrary to Congressional Intent
Although the ADA requires that employers make reasonable
accommodations for workers with disabilities, it does not provide
that employees with disabilities receive preferential treatment over
91. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999); EEOC,
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act at 44 (1999).
92. Dorsey, supra note 90, at 445–46; see Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029.
93. Dalton v. Subaru–Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 1998).
94. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J.,
dissenting).
95. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1182 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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equally qualified (or more qualified) employees without disabilities.
In fact, in preparing the ADA, Congress noted that its intent was to
level the playing field and give individuals with disabilities a way to
fully engage in society and business96, not to tip the scales in favor of
individuals with disabilities. As stated in Humiston-Keeling:
The contrary rule would convert a nondiscrimination statute
into a mandatory preference statute, a result which would be
both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the
ADA and an unreasonable imposition on the employers and
coworkers of disabled employees. A policy of giving the
job to the best applicant is legitimate and
nondiscriminatory.97
Additionally, if Congress wished to mandate noncompetitive
reassignment, it could have done so explicitly. Instead, Congress
couched the reassignment language within a list of ways that an
employer may reasonably accommodate an employee.98 This
language indicates that reasonable accommodation does not require
reassignment in all cases, but rather, that such a form of reasonable
accommodation may be reasonable in certain instances, but not in
others.
C. Barnett Does Not Mandate Noncompetitive Reassignment
Barnett has provided little guidance for courts struggling to
understand the parameters of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirement and, specifically, reassignment. Since this decision was
handed down, courts have used its reasoning to come to dramatically
different conclusions about whether the ADA mandates
noncompetitive reassignment in non seniority-based systems.99 The
spectrum of conclusions reached by lower courts is itself evidence of
the limited value of Barnett in the context of non seniority-based
hiring systems. Unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari and
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2016).
97. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (“[R]easonable accommodation may include . . . job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”) (emphasis added).
99. Compare St. Joseph’s Hosp. II, 842 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016), with EEOC v.
United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012).
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resolves this split, courts will continue to use Barnett’s reasoning to
come to vastly different conclusions. By granting certiorari in Huber,
the Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to take up the
mandatory reassignment circuit split. Thus, it is likely that this issue
will ultimately be decided by the highest court.
D. Noncompetitive Reassignment Is Unduly Burdensome
When the Supreme Court inevitably takes up the mandatory
reassignment circuit split, it should hold not only that noncompetitive
reassignment is unwarranted by the ADA, but also that it is
unwarranted in light of policy considerations.
The ADA does not mandate that employers provide employees
with perfect accommodation. Rather, it mandates reasonable
accommodation. Mandating noncompetitive reassignment goes too
far. It imposes a burden on employers to make perfect
accommodations for employees with disabilities at the expense of an
employer’s legitimate business interests and the interests of other
applicants. A business has a duty not only to its consumers, but also
to its employees, to hire the most qualified candidates in order to
preserve efficiency, provide quality products, and provide competent
services. In a hospital setting, the placement of a potentially lesserqualified candidate can have a significant impact on the health and
safety of patients. To require an employer to abandon its bestqualified applicant policy in such circumstances is undesirable for
both employers and patients alike.
VI. CONCLUSION
The circuit split regarding noncompetitive reassignment has
serious repercussions for employers and employees across the nation.
Ultimately, it is likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to
resolve this split in the near future. If it does, the Supreme Court
should find that the ADA does not require noncompetitive
reassignment

